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THE LIMITS OF OBLIGATION.

If one can save a human life at minor personal cost, one is morally
required to do so. Few persons would disagree with such a modest proposition. Although the extent of an individual's positive moral obligation to aid
others can be controversial, this watered-down principle of "minimal altruism" receives nearly universal acceptance. Yet, as James Fishkin points out
in The Limits of Obligation, this principle is one of many common ethical
assumptions that break down when applied on a sufficiently large social
scale.
Fishkin introduces this thesis in a striking manner by analyzing the consequences of "minimal altruism" for Peter Singer's famine relief scenario
(pp. 3-7). 1 This scenario supposes that a small gift of five or ten dollars to a
famine relief charity will save the life of a starving refugee. The cost of
such a donation to a typical donor in Western society would be negligible;
the value of the human life saved is far greater. Thus, the principle of
"minimal altruism" requires that one make the donation. Fishkin, however, argues that this principle also mandates many more small contributions, since each incremental contribution saves a human life at an
imperceptibly small marginal cost to the contributor. Ultimately, "minimal
altruism" requires the donor to continue giving until the marginal cost of an
additional gift becomes burdensome, by which point he may have given
away a substantial portion of his income. Thus, a moral obligation which
seemed unassailable at a low level results in generosity that most of us
would consider far beyond the call of duty. From this example, and many
others Fishkin concludes: that "[t]he admission of any . . . principle of
general obligation to perform actions on behalf of any other person or
group will lead, at the large scale, to the breakdown of the basic structure of
individual morality." 2 Paradoxically, the author argues persuasively that to
abandon such a notion of general obligation entirely seems "a denial of our
common humanity" (p. 33).
Fishkin's "basic structure of individual morality" consists of three moral
assumptions. Fishkin calls the first the "robust zone of indifference": "A
substantial proportion of any individual's actions falls appropriately within
the zone of indifference or permissibly free personal choice" (p. 23). This
principle simply recognizes that most of our daily actions have so little
moral significance as to be morally neutral - e.g., choosing to wear a blue
sweater rather than a brown one.3 The words of this principle are carefully
chosen. The zone is "robust" because the vast bulk of our actions fall
I. Singer, Famine, Aj/luence and Morality, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 21-35
(P. Laslett & J. Fishkin eds. 1979).
2. P. 33 (emphasis in original). General obligations, as Fishkin uses the term are those
which '~'!Y of us could owe to a'!Yone else, including a total stranger." P. 25 (emphasis in
original).
3. The author does not suggest that such acts have no moral significance, but that the
moral implications fall below the "cutoff for triviality." P. 89.
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within it. Fishkin finds this situation entirely appropriate, for if moral issues were to invade the bulk of our mundane daily decisions, we would lose
the freedom to control our daily lives that we correctly regard as our right.
Second, Fishkin assumes the existence of a "cutoff for heroism": "Certain levels of sacrifice cannot be morally required of any given individual"
(p. 14). For example, a soldier is not morally blameworthy ifhe refuses to
sacrifice himself by smothering a grenade with his body, even though the
act would save his comrades. No one can define the precise level at which
sacrifice becomes heroic. This imprecision makes the assumption relatively
uncontroversial. As Fishkin notes, this assumption is commonplace in recent moral theory.4
Fishkin's final moral assumption divides all acts into three categories
according to their moral significance. An act must be either: (1) indifferent,
falling within the "robust zone of indifference"; (2) required, wherein failure to act warrants blame; or (3) supererogatory, being beyond the "cutoff
for heroism." Fishkin assumes that any given act fits one and only one of
these three categories. Having posited these three assumptions, Fishkin
proceeds to test various theories of obligation against them. Most of these
theories break down at a large scale because they require results inconsistent with Fishkin's assumptions. The "minimal altruism" principle, for example, directly conflicts with these assumptions, since it requires additional,
repetitive relief contributions, even when one has given away a substantial
portion of one's income. "Minimal altruism" requires acts more reasonably
categorized as supererogatory. The conflict is plain; "minimal altruism," if
carried to its logical extreme, is inconsistent with the "cutoff for heroism."
The indictment of "minimal altruism" applies with even greater force to
moral theories with a stronger concept of general obligation. Classical utilitarianism, for example, suggests that when the "perfectly sympathetic spectator" views the world impartially, he must maximize the net utility or
happiness of all persons. General obligations to others necessarily become
"impossible to deny" (p. 159). Christianity's "Golden Rule" is another
moral theory which cannot avoid conflict with Fishkin's moral assumptions. As Fishkin points out, if an actor must treat a starving refugee as the
actor would wish to be treated in the same situation, the actor will assume
general obligations much greater than the more modest principle of "minimal altruism would impose" (p. 157). Under both classical utilitarianism
and the Golden Rule, demanding general obligations require individual
sacrifice far beyond the "cutoff for heroism" integral to Fishkin's "basic
structure of individual morality."
Fishkin also applies his thesis to the generalization argument, which
analyzes the morality of an action by considering the consequences of its
becoming the general pattern of conduct (p. 97). Thus, while a single apple
picked from a roadside orchard arguably does no harm and hence falls
within the zone of indifference, a general pattern of everyone picking from
the orchard would cause significant harm and would thus fall within the
zone of required inaction. Fishkin assails the generalization argument on
two grounds. First, he argues that the generalization principle would shrink
4. P. 17; see, e.g., D. RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION 95-96 (1971); Unnson, Saints and Heroes, in MORAL CONCEPTS 60-73 (J. Feinberg e~. 1969).
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the robust zone of indifference to insignificance. If acts are judged on the
hypothetical results of everyone behaving the same way, many of our most
mundane actions would be proscribed because they will have some evil result.5 Secondly, the discrepancy between the morality of the same action
performed in isolation and on a large scale itself illustrates the author's
thesis. If an action cal} be classified as both indifferent and proscribed, the
unique classification assumption is violated and "non-equivalence" exists.
Fishkin's argument may be most vulnerable at this point. David Lyons
has advanced a theory that denies the nonequivalence of the generalization
argument, yet attempts to preserve the unique classification assumption. 6
Lyons contends that the moral character of the apple-picking does not vary
whether the act is viewed in isolation or is generalized over like acts. Although the orchard is not significantly harmed until some threshold number
of apples are picked, each person who picked an apple contributed equally
to the depletion of the orchard. While an apple picked from a full orchard
may seem morally insignificant, this illusion persists only so long as we ignore the act's contribution to a serious harm. According to Lyons, the
equal distribution of blame to each act places each squarely within the category of required inaction, maintaining the integrity of the unique classification assumption.
Fishkin's response to Lyons' argument is unsatisfactory. Fishkin argues
that nonequivalence still exists on a sufficiently large scale, even admitting
Lyons' threshold concept. Where it takes a large number of acts to reach
the threshold, one of those acts viewed in isolation will be allocated such a
small fraction of the threshold effect as to make its effect trivial and place it
within the zone of indifference. Thus, the nonequivalence: the thresholdbreaking act viewed alone is indifferent, while generalized over similar acts
it is proscribed. Fishkin himself recognizes two problems with this response: it assumes that the threshold-crossing acts are more numerous than
perhaps Lyon would admit, and it further assumes a "cutoff for triviality"
and "robust zone of indifference."7
Fishkin's response to Lyons' argument demonstrates how utterly dependent his thesis is upon his initial moral assumptions concerning the robust
zone of indifference, the cutoff for heroism, and the uniqueness of classifications. Far from being a fault, however, this dependence is responsible for
the impressive strength of his argument. The three assumptions possess
strong intellectual and intuitive appeal. Admittedly, some of their attractiveness results from the necessarily unspecific way in which they are
phrased. This, however, does not undermine Fishkin's equally imprecise
5. Fishkin presents the example of serving beef at a dinner party. While seemingly innocent, it is not totally so; the practice contributes in a small way both to the wasteful use of the
world's food resources and to the guests' chances of heart disease. P. 95.
6. See D. LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 62-188 (1965).
7. Fishkin points out that a denial of a cutoff for triviality must also result in the collapse
of the essential "robust zone of indifference" since "however trivial the consequences of an
individual act, when it is generalized over a large enough number of other similar acts its
consequences will routinely be enlarged to a level of moral significance." The collapse would
entail "a pervasive moralization of everyday life." P. 104. This pervasive moralization would
cause the loss of freedom to do as we please in broad areas of our lives. P. 22.
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conclusion: that at some sufficiently large social scale, our basic ethical
structure breaks down under the weight of general obligation.
Fishkin's work offers little practical aid to attorneys. His work belongs
to the realm of moral philosophy. Fishkin analyzes individual obligations
that are essentially extra-legal. His arguments are sophisticated and tightly
crafted. Many times the reader will think of potential objections only to
find them addressed comprehensively in subsequent paragraphs.
Refreshingly, Fishkin admits his inability to offer a solution to the problem he so clearly articulates. Rather, the book sets out the general problem
and then proceeds to numerous applications and illustrations. Fishkill
does, however, hint at possibilities. In particular he suggests that obligations that become problematic for individuals to assume on a large scale
might better be left to "collectivities, nation-states, and other large institutions" (p. 9). This tentative suggestion offers little promise for an escape
from Fishkin's dilemma. While shifting responsibility for problems such as
world hunger from individuals to collectivities may mitigate the problems
articulated in Fishkin's thesis, it seems unlikely to solve the problems. Presumably, a "cutoff for heroism" exists for larger political units as well as for
individuals, and the moral demands of the relatively disadvantaged in the
world may tax even the largest political institutions' ability to respond without "heroic" efforts.

